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Abstract
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and
subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis
we find that the diﬀerent predictions of previous imitation models are
due to diﬀerent informational assumptions, not to diﬀerent behavioral
rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a
laboratory experiment we test the diﬀerent theories by systematically
varying information conditions. We find significant eﬀects of seemingly
innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation
model predicts the diﬀerences between treatments well. The data pro-
vide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of
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choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional.
Rather individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is
increasing in payoﬀ diﬀerences.
JEL codes: C72; C91; C92; D43; L13.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imita-
tion; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations.
1 Introduction
Everyone who watches children growing up will attest that imitation is a
main source of learning. And introspection shows that imitation also plays
a significant role for adult learning. In fact, imitation is prevalent in much
of everyday decision making, in particular when the environment is complex
or largely unknown. Openings in chess games are a good example or finding
routes through traﬃc, or buying complex consumer items like cars, laptops,
or digital cameras. But, while social scientists and psychologists have long
recognized the importance of imitation (see Ash, 1952, for an early example),
imitation has only recently moved into the focus of economists.
Important theoretical advances towards understanding imitation have
been made by Vega—Redondo (1997) and Schlag (1998 and 1999). Both
approaches are based on the idea that individuals who face repeated choice
problems will imitate others who obtained high payoﬀs. But despite this
basic similarity, the two theories imply markedly diﬀerent predictions when
applied to specific games. For example, for games with a Cournot struc-
ture, Schlag’s model predicts Cournot—Nash equilibrium play, while Vega—
Redondo’s model predicts the Walrasian outcome. The latter prediction is
also obtained by Selten and Ostmann’s (2001) notion of an ‘imitation equi-
librium’, while Cournot—Nash is also predicted by imitation models with
large population as studied by Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996).
The current paper makes two main contributions. First, it introduces a
generalized theoretical approach to imitation, which enables us to analyze
why the models of Vega—Redondo (1997) and Schlag (1998, 1999) come to
such diﬀerent predictions. Basically, the models diﬀer along two diﬀerent
dimensions, the informational structure (“whom agents imitate”) and the
behavioral rule (“how agents imitate”). While agents in Vega-Redondo’s
model observe their immediate competitors, in Schlag’s model they observe
others who are just like them but play in diﬀerent groups against diﬀerent
opponents. Additionally, agents in Vega-Redondo’s model copy the most
successful action of the previous period whenever they can. In contrast,
Schlag’s agents only imitate in a probabilistic fashion and the probability
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with which they imitate is proportional to the observed diﬀerence in pay-
oﬀs between own and most successful action. We show that the diﬀerence
between the two models is due to the diﬀerent informational assumptions
rather than the diﬀerent adjustment rules. In that sense, it is more impor-
tant whom one imitates than how one imitates. In particular, if one imitates
one’s own opponents, outcomes become very competitive. If, on the other
hand, one imitates other players who face the same problem as oneself but
play against diﬀerent opponents, Nash equilibrium play is obtained.
The second objective of our paper is to present rigorous experimental
tests of the diﬀerent imitation models. We chose to study imitation in a
normal form game with the payoﬀ structure of a simple discrete Cournot
game. This has the advantage that the theoretical predictions of the various
imitation models are very distinct. Both traditional benchmark outcomes
of oligopoly models (Cournot—Nash equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium)
are supported by at least one imitation model. Also, the games are easy
to implement in an experiment, and we have a good understanding of how
Cournot markets operate in laboratory environments under diﬀerent cir-
cumstances.1 The key design feature of our experiment is that we vary
the feedback information subjects receive between rounds of play. In one
treatment they observe their competitors’ actions and profits, in another
they observe the actions and profits of others who are like them but played
against diﬀerent people. And, finally, there is a treatment where agents have
access to both types of information.
On some level, these variations appear to be very innocent and many
(learning) models would not predict any diﬀerence between them. In that
sense, the experimental part of our study examines whether (and if so how)
slight variations in the informational structure of a repeated-game setting
have an impact on behavior. We find that the variations indeed have sig-
nificant eﬀects. Moreover, the directions of these eﬀects are well organized
by our generalized imitation model. Specifically, average outputs are ranked
according to the theoretical predictions and significantly so: The treatment
1See e.g. Plott (1989), Holt (1995), and Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) for
surveys.
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in which opponents can be observed is the most competitive. The treat-
ment in which only subjects in other groups can be observed is roughly in
line with the Cournot—Nash equilibrium prediction and is the least compet-
itive. Intermediate outcomes result if subjects have access to both types of
information.
Analyzing individual adjustments, we find strong support for imitative
behavior. Simple imitation can explain a surprisingly large fraction of sub-
jects’ decisions. But subjects diﬀer in their propensity to imitate. While
some imitate not more often than a randomization device would, others
are almost pure imitators. In general though, we find that, much in line
with Schlag’s model, the likelihood of imitation increases in the diﬀerence
between the highest payoﬀ observed and the own payoﬀ. In addition, we
find that imitation is more pronounced when subjects observe their direct
competitors–rather than others who have the same role but play in diﬀerent
groups.
All these results are obtained from studying choice data. Subjects do
imitate and they do it in specific ways. Whether or not subjects are aware of
this, is a diﬀerent issue on which we shed some light by analyzing replies to
a post—experimental questionnaire. Interestingly, many replies quite clearly
reveal that subjects know what they are doing. Quite a number of subjects
perceive themselves as imitating.
Despite being inherently “behavioral”, there have been few prior exper-
iments on imitation. In particular, Schlag’s imitation model has not been
experimentally tested at all, while the models of Vega—Redondo and Selten
and Ostmann have been subject to isolated experiments. Huck, Normann,
and Oechssler (1999, 2000) and Oﬀerman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002)
find experimental support for Vega-Redondo’s model. Also, Abbink and
Brandts (2002) provide data that are well-organized by a model closely re-
lated to Vega-Redondo’s. Finally, Selten and Apesteguia (2002) find some
experimental support for Selten and Ostmann’s (2001) static model of imi-
tation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the games and the experimental details. In Section 3 we review the imita-
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tion models, introduce a general framework, and derive theoretical results.
In Section 4 the experimental results are reported and, finally, Section 5
concludes. Most proofs are collected in Appendix A. Appendix B contains
a treatment of Selten and Ostmann’s imitation equilibrium. The instruc-
tions for the experiment are shown in Appendix C and Appendix D contains
additional regression results.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiments subjects repeatedly play simple 3—player normal form
games, with a payoﬀ structure that is derived from a symmetric Cournot
game. All players have five pure strategies with identical labels, a, b, c, d,
and e. Subjects are, however, not told anything about the game’s payoﬀ
function apart from the fact that their payoﬀ deterministically depends on
their own choice and the choices of two others, and that the payoﬀ function
is the same throughout all of the experiment (see the translated instructions
in Appendix C).
Interaction in the experiment takes place in populations of nine subjects.
Each subject has a role and belongs to a group. There are three roles,
labelled X,Y, and Z, filled by three subjects each. Roles are allocated
randomly at the beginning of the session and then kept fixed for the entire
session. Sessions last for 60 periods. In each period, subjects are randomly
matched into three groups, such that always one X—player is matched with
one of the Y —players and one of the Z—players. One might wonder why
we introduce roles to study behavior in a symmetric game. The answer is
twofold. First, it is exactly this “trick” that allows us to disentangle the
eﬀects of imitation rules and information. Second, we will be able to use the
identical setup for studying asymmetric games in follow-up projects.
While subjects know that they are randomly matched each period, they
are not told with whom they are matched and there are no subject-specific
labels. In each experimental session, two independent populations of nine
subjects participate to increase anonymity. After each period, subjects learn
their own payoﬀ. Additional feedback information depends on the treat-
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ment. There are three treatments altogether.
Treatment ROLE In treatment ROLE a player is informed, after each
period t, of the actions and payoﬀs in t of players who have the same
role as himself but play in diﬀerent groups.
Treatment GROUP In treatment GROUP a player is informed, after
each period t, of the actions and payoﬀs in t of players in his own
group.
Treatment FULL In treatment FULL a player can observe all the infor-
mation given in treatments ROLE and GROUP and learn the average
payoﬀ in the entire population.2
The payoﬀ function is based on a linear Cournot market with inverse de-
mand, p = 120−X, and zero costs. The strategies a, b, c, d, and e correspond
to the output quantities 20, 23, 30, 36, and 40, respectively. That is, a cor-
responds to the symmetric joint profit maximizing output, c to the Cournot
output, and e to the symmetric Walrasian output, where price equals mar-
ginal cost (of zero). The payoﬀ table (unknown to subjects) is displayed in
Table 1. Subjects are told that the experimental payoﬀs are converted to
Euros using an exchange rate of 3000:1.3
The computerized experiments4 were carried out in the Laboratory for
Experimental Research in Economics in Bonn. Subjects were recruited via
posters on campus. For each treatment we carried out three sessions –
each with two independent populations of nine subjects, which gives us six
independent observations per treatment. Accordingly, the total number of
subjects was 162 (= 9 × 6 × 3). The experiments lasted on average 70
minutes, and average payments were 15.25 Euros.5 After the 60 rounds
subjects were presented with a questionnaire in which they were asked for
their major field of study and for the motivation of their decisions.
2Notice that in FULL a player cannot observe the choices and payoﬀs of players that
are neither in his group nor in his role.
3 In the first session of treatment FULL we used an exchange rate of 4000:1.
4The program was written with z—tree of Fischbacher (1999).
5At the time of the experiment one Euro was worth about one US dollar.
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Table 1: Payoﬀ table
action combination of other players in group
aa ab ac ad ae bb bc bd be cc cd ce dd de ee
a 1200 1140 1000 880 800 1080 940 820 740 800 680 600 560 480 400
b 1311 1242 1081 943 851 1173 1012 874 782 851 713 621 575 483 391
c 1500 1410 1200 1020 900 1320 1110 930 810 900 720 600 540 420 300
d 1584 1476 1224 1008 864 1368 1116 900 756 864 648 504 432 288 144
e 1600 1480 1200 960 800 1360 1080 840 680 800 560 400 320 160 0
Note: The order in which the actions of the other group members is displayed does
not matter.
3 Imitation models
3.1 Theory
In this section we will establish theoretical predictions for various imitation
models in the context of our experimental design. Recall that the treatments
vary with respect to the information subjects receive about actions and/or
payoﬀs in the previous round. Let player (i, j)t be the player who has
role i ∈ {X,Y,Z} in group j ∈ {1, 2, 3} at time t, and let sji (t) be that
player’s strategy in t. We refer to the set of individuals whose actions
and payoﬀs can be observed by individual (i, j)t, as (i, j)t’s reference group,
R(i, j)t. Individual (i, j)t’s set of observed actions includes all actions played
by someone in his reference group and is denoted by
O(i, j)t := {skh(t)|(h, k)t ∈ R(i, j)t}.
Notice that (i, j)t ∈ R(i, j)t and sji (t) ∈ O(i, j)t in all our experimental
treatments.
Following Schlag (1999) we call a behavioral rule imitating if it prescribes
for each individual to choose an observed action from the previous round.
A noisy imitating rule is a rule that is imitating with probability 1− ε and
allows for mistakes with probability ε > 0. (In case of a mistake any other
action is chosen with positive probability.) A behavioral rule with inertia
allows an individual to change his action only with probability π ∈ (0, 1) in
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each round. In the following we shall first characterize diﬀerent imitation
rules according to their properties without noise and inertia. Predictions for
the Cournot game will then be derived by adding noise and inertia.
A popular and plausible rule is “imitate the best” (see e.g. Vega—
Redondo, 1997), which simply prescribes to choose the strategy that in the
previous period performed best among the observed actions. In our setting
it is possible that an action yields diﬀerent payoﬀs in diﬀerent groups. This
implies that it is a priori not clear how an agent should evaluate the ac-
tions he observes. An evaluation rule assigns a value to each action in a
player’s set of observed actions O(i, j)t. When an action yields the same
payoﬀ everywhere in his reference group, there is no ambiguity and the ac-
tion is evaluated with this observed payoﬀ.6 When diﬀerent payoﬀs occur
for the same action, various rules might be applied. Below we will focus on
two evaluation rules that appear particularly natural in a simple imitation
setting with boundedly rational agents: the max rule where each strategy is
evaluated according to the highest payoﬀ it received, and the average rule
where each strategy is evaluated according to the average payoﬀ observed
in the reference group. Of course, other rules, such as a “pessimistic” min
rule, might also have some good justification. Nevertheless, we shall follow
the previous literature and focus on the max and the average rules.7
Definition 1 An imitating rule is called “imitate the best” if it satisfies the
property that (without noise and inertia) an agent switches to a new action
if and only if this action has been played by an agent in his reference group
in the previous round, and was evaluated as at least as good as that of any
other action played in his reference group. When several actions satisfy this,
each is chosen with positive probability.
• “Imitate the best” combined with the average rule is called “imitate the
best average” (IBA).
6This is always the case in treatment GROUP.
7For “imitate the best average” see, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Schlag
(1999). For “imitate the best max” see Selten and Ostmann (2001).
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• “Imitate the best” combined with the max rule is called “imitate the
best max” (IBM).
Schlag (1998) shows in the context of a decision problem in which agents
can observe one other participant that “imitate the best” and many other
plausible rules do not satisfy certain optimality conditions. Instead, Schlag
(1998) advocates the “Proportional Imitation Rule” which prescribes to im-
itate an action with a probability proportional to the (positive part of the)
payoﬀ diﬀerence between that action’s payoﬀ from last period and the own
payoﬀ from last period. If the observed action yielded a lower payoﬀ, it is
never imitated.
The extension of this analysis to the case of agents observing two or
more actions is not straightforward. Schlag (1999) considers the case of two
observations and singles out two rules that are both “optimal” according to
a number of plausible criteria: the “double imitation” rule (DI), and the
“sequential proportional observation” rule (SPOR). In both cases, Schlag
assumes that strategies are evaluated with the average rule. Specifying the
two rules in more detail is beyond the scope of this study since our data do
not allow to check more than some general properties of classes of rules to
which DI and SPOR belong.
Schlag (1999, Remark 2) shows that with two observations both, DI and
SPOR, satisfy the following properties:
(i) They are imitating rules.
(ii) The probability of imitating another action increases with that action’s
previous payoﬀ, and decreases with the payoﬀ the (potential) imitator
achieved himself.
(iii) If all actions in O(i, j)t are distinct, the more successful actions are
imitated with higher probability.
Furthermore, it can be shown that DI satisfies the following properties.
(iv) Never switch to an action with an average payoﬀ lower than the average
payoﬀ of the own action.
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(v) Imitate the action with the highest average payoﬀ in the sample with
strictly positive probability (unless one already plays an action with
the best average payoﬀ).
Property (iv) shows that DI belongs to the large class of imitating rules
that use the average evaluation rule and can be described as “imitate only
if better”. Combined with property (v) “imitate the best with positive
probability”, this is all we need for deriving the theoretical properties of DI
and similar rules in the context of our experiment.
Definition 2 An imitating rule is called a “weakly imitate the best average”
rule (WIBA) if it satisfies (without noise and inertia) properties (iv) and
(v).
If we modify Properties (iv) and (v) to allow for the max rule, we obtain
(iv0) Never switch to an action with a maximal payoﬀ lower than the max-
imal payoﬀ of the own action.
(v0) Imitate the action with the highest maximal payoﬀ in the sample with
strictly positive probability (unless one already plays an action with
the highest maximal payoﬀ).
Definition 3 An imitating rule is called a “weakly imitate the best max”
rule (WIBM) if it satisfies (without noise and inertia) properties (iv’) and
(v’).
While IBA (“imitate the best average”) as well as DI (“double imita-
tion”) belong to the class of WIBA (“weakly imitate the best average”)
rules, IBM belongs to WIBM. The rule SPOR does not belong to either
class of rules since it violates (iv) and (iv’).
Both, WIBA and WIBM allow for a large variety of specific adjustment
rules, including Vega-Redondo’s imitate the best rule as well as forms of
probabilistic adjustment as considered by Schlag. In the following, we will
state all results for these rather large classes of rules. Hence, it is in this sense
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that we will conclude that the informational structure (whom to imitate) is
more important than the specific rule (how to imitate).
Before we proceed with deriving theoretical predictions, we need to in-
troduce some further notation. The imitation dynamics induce a Markov
chain on a finite state space Ω. A state ω ∈ Ω is characterized by three strat-
egy profiles, one for each group, i.e., by a collection ((s11, s
1
2, s
1
3), (s
2
1, s
2
2, s
2
3),
(s31, s
3
2, s
3
3)). Notice that there is no need to refer to specific individuals in
the definition of a state, i.e., here sji (without the time index) refers to the
strategy used by whoever has role i and happens to be in group j.
We shall refer to uniform states as states where s = sji = s
k
h for all
i, j, h, k and denote a uniform state by ωs, s ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}. Two uniform
states will be of particular interest. The state in which everybody plays the
Cournot Nash strategy c, to which we will refer as the Cournot state ωc;
and the state in which everybody plays the Walrasian strategy e, to which
we shall refer as the Walrasian state ωe.
To analyze the properties of the Markov processes induced by the vari-
ous imitation rules discussed above, we shall now add (vanishing) noise and
inertia. That is, whenever we refer in the following to some rule as, for ex-
ample “imitate the best” (or, in short, IBM), we shall imply that agents are
subject to, both, inertia and (vanishing) noise. States that are in the sup-
port of the limit invariant distribution of the process (for ε→ 0) are called
stochastically stable. The (graph theoretic) methods for analyzing stochastic
stability (pioneered in economics by Canning, 1992, Kandori, Mailath, and
Rob, 1993, and Young, 1993) are, by now, standard (see e.g. Fudenberg and
Levine, 1998, and Young, 1998, for text book treatments).
In the following we will state a number of propositions that show how
the long-run predictions of the imitation rules we consider depend on the
underlying informational structures. We begin by stating results for WIBA
and WIBM. It will turn out that WIBA and WIBM rules lead to identi-
cal predictions if agents either observe other agents in their group or other
agents in the same role. They diﬀer if agents can observe both as in treat-
ment FULL. Finally, we will analyze SPOR rules and show that they yield
the same long-run predictions regardless of the treatment.
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Our first proposition concerns WIBA and WIBM rules in treatment
GROUP.
Proposition 1 If agents follow either a WIBA (“weakly imitate the best
average”) or a WIBM (“weakly imitate the best max”) rule and if the refer-
ence group is as in treatment GROUP, the Walrasian state ωe is the unique
stochastically stable state.
Proof See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is analogous to the intuition in Vega-Redondo’s
original treatment of the imitate the best rule. In any given group, the agent
with the highest output obtains the highest profit as long as prices are pos-
itive. This induces a push toward more competitive outcomes.8 Insofar,
Proposition 1 can be seen as generalization of Vega-Redondo’s original re-
sult to the case where agents might be randomly rematched. As long as the
informational structure is such that agents observe only their competitors
(in the last period) the Walrasian outcome results.
Let us now turn to treatment ROLE where (h, k)t ∈ R(i, j)t if h = i.
We will see that the change of the informational structure has dramatic
consequences. If agents can only observe others who are in the same role
as they themselves but play in diﬀerent groups, the unique stochastically
stable outcome under both, WIBA rule and WIBM rules, is the Cournot—
Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 If agents follow a WIBA or a WIBM rule and if the ref-
erence group is as in treatment ROLE, the Cournot state ωc is the unique
stochastically stable state.
Proof See Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is that any deviation from the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium play lowers the deviator’s absolute payoﬀ. Agents in the
8 Introducing constant positive marginal cost does not change the result. If price is
below marginal cost, the agent with the lowest output is imitated which again pushes the
process towards the Walrasian state.
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same role will observe this but will not imitate because they earn more
using the equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, every non-equilibrium
state can be left by a single mutation, namely by having an agent who is
currently not playing his best reply switch to his best reply. This improves
his payoﬀ and will be observed by other agents in the same role who will
follow suit. What remains to be shown is that one can construct sequences
of one-shot mutations that lead into the Cournot state from any other state.
To establish this claim we use the fact that the game at hand has a potential.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 establishes our earlier claim. While the
specifics of an imitation rule do not matter as long as the rule falls in the
rather large class of WIBA and WIBM rules, changing the informational
structure has a profound eﬀect on long-run behavior. Turning to treatment
FULL one might expect that its richer informational structure (with agents
having the combined information of treatments GROUP and ROLE) causes
some tension between the Walrasian and the Cournot outcome. It turns
out that this intuition is correct. In fact, with a WIBA rule there are two
stochastically stable states in treatment FULL, the Cournot state (where
everybody plays c), and the state where everybody plays d.
Proposition 3 If agents follow a WIBA rule and if the reference group is
as in treatment FULL, then both, the Cournot state ωc and the state in
which everyone takes action d, ωd, are the stochastically stable states.
Proof See Appendix A.
Comparing a WIBA rule with a WIBM rule, one might say that agents
following WIBM are “more aggressive”. Hence, one might intuitively expect
that WIBM leads to higher quantities than WIBA. As the next proposition
shows this is true in the sense that, in addition to ωc and ωd, the Walrasian
state, ωe, is stochastically stable under WIBM.
Proposition 4 If agents follow a WIBM rule and if the reference group is
as in treatment FULL, then the Cournot state ωc, the state in which everyone
takes action d, ωd, and the Walrasian state ωe are the stochastically stable
states.
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Proof See Appendix A.
The proof of Propositions 3 shows that specifics of the payoﬀ function
matter for the exact prediction under WIBA. A generalization for a larger
class of payoﬀ functions would predict outcomes ranging from the Cournot to
some more competitive outcomes (without exactly specifying the boundary).
On the other hand, the proofs for Propositions, 1, 2, and 4 do not make use
of anything that is specific to our chosen payoﬀ function and it is easy to see
that they could be generalized to a large class of Cournot games in exactly
the same form as above.
Finally, in contrast to the previous studied rules, the SPOR rule of Schlag
(1999) also allows to imitate actions that do worse than the current action
one is using. This has the consequence that, in the framework of stochastic
stability, any uniform state can be a long run outcome of the process.
Proposition 5 If agents follow a SPOR rule, all uniform states are sto-
chastically stable regardless of their reference group.
Proof Agents following SPOR imitate any strategy with positive proba-
bility except an action that yields 0, the absolutely worst payoﬀ (see
Schlag, 1999). Thus, we observe a) that only uniform states are ab-
sorbing and b) that it is possible to move from any uniform state to
any other uniform state by just one mutation, which implies that all
uniform states are stochastically stable.¥
In the appendix we also analyze the predictions of Selten and Ostmann’s
(2001) imitation equilibrium. Interestingly, it turns out that, despite its
static character, it makes the same predictions about behavior in the long
run as the class of dynamic WIBM rules.
3.2 Some qualitative hypotheses and simulations
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical results and indicates for each behavioral
rule considered above whether two easy-to-check properties are satisfied.
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Table 2: Summary of predictions
Imitation
Rule
never imitate
worse than own∗
long run
prediction∗∗
WIBA X
ωe in GROUP
ωc in ROLE
ωc, ωd in FULL
DI X as WIBA
IBA X as WIBA
WIBM X
ωe in GROUP
ωc in ROLE
ωc, ωd, ωe in FULL
IBM X as WIBM
SPOR — ωa, ωb, ωc, ωd, ωe
Note: A “X” indicates that the theory in question satisfies the property given the
rule to evaluate payoﬀs. “−” indicates that the theory does not in general satisfy
this property. ∗ This prediction is without noise. ∗∗This is the set of stochastically
stable outcomes.
All imitation rules, with the exception of SPOR, have in common that
they predict that agents should not switch to strategies that are evaluated as
worse than the strategy they are currently using. With respect to total out-
puts in the Cournot market games, all imitation rules, except SPOR, suggest
that quantities in treatment GROUP (where Walrasian levels are expected
in the long run) should be rather high, whereas in treatment ROLE a lower
output level, the Cournot outcome, is expected. Finally, the theoretical re-
sults suggest for treatment FULL quantities between GROUP and ROLE.
Thus, we obtain the following qualitative hypothesis about the ordering of
output levels:
QH : ROLE ¹ FULL ¹ GROUP.
Hypothesis QH has, strictly speaking two parts. First, it suggests that
there is a diﬀerence between the experimental treatments (what many other
theories would not predict). Second, it suggests a particular order that would
be expected if imitation is an important force for subjects’ adaptations.
The problem with long run predictions derived from stochastic stability
analysis is that they are just that: long run predictions. Furthermore, in
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Figure 1: Block time series of average outputs per treatment (simulated data).
Note: “Block 0” denotes average outputs in the first period.
general they crucially depend on the assumption of vanishing noise. Thus,
the issue arises how imitation processes behave in the short run and in the
presence of non-vanishing noise. In order to address this issue, we run simu-
lations for the diﬀerent treatments. In particular, we simulate population of
9 players over 60 rounds when each player behaves according to the IBM rule
(IBA yields almost identical results) given the reference group defined by the
respective treatment. The noise level we use is substantial: with probability
0.8 in each round a player follows IBM and with probability 0.2 a player
chooses randomly one of the five actions (each then with equal probability).
For each treatment we simulate 100 such populations with starting actions
chosen from a uniform distribution.
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Figure 1 shows average quantities in these simulations organized in blocks
of ten periods each.9 Already in the first 10 periods, the qualitative pre-
diction expressed in QH is apparent. After 20 rounds, behavior is fairly
constant. Over all 60 periods, average outputs in the simulations were 30.3
for ROLE, 33.6 for FULL, and 37.7 for GROUP, diﬀerences being significant
at any conventional significance level. Therefore, importantly, the predic-
tions we obtained for the long run and with vanishing noise appear rather
robust also for the short run and in the presence of noise.
4 Experimental results
We now turn to the experimental analysis of the generalized imitation frame-
work proposed above. We organize this section as follows. First, based on
the qualitative hypotheses QH, we evaluate the data on the aggregate level.
This will show whether and, if so, how the diﬀerent informational structures
aﬀect subjects’ behavior. While this will provide some indirect evidence
for the relevance of imitation, a more thorough study of imitation must be
based on data from individual adjustments. Thus, in Section 4.2 we ana-
lyze individual data by counting how often actual adjustments are in line
with predicted adjustments. This is followed in Section 4.3 by a regression
analysis that helps us to test whether the probability of imitating is indeed,
as Schlag’s models suggest, a function of the observed payoﬀ diﬀerences.
Finally, we conclude this section by analyzing the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. This will provide additional insight into whether subjects are
intentional imitators or whether it just looks as if they are.
4.1 Aggregate behavior
We begin by considering some summary statistics on the aggregate level.
Table 3 shows average outputs for all treatments, separately for the first
round, all 60 rounds of the experiment, and the last 30 rounds. Standard
deviations of the six observations per treatment are shown in parentheses.
9Recall that actions a, b, c, d, and e correspond to output quantities 20, 23, 30, and 40,
respectively.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Treatment
ROLE GROUP FULL
avg. output, round 1
27.48
(3.56)
26.72
(3.10)
26.70
(3.20)
avg. output, rounds 1-60
30.32
(.452)
32.96
(.825)
31.71
(.829)
avg. output, rounds 31-60
30.71
(.514)
33.57
(.972)
32.31
(.881)
avg. var., rounds 1-60 54.43 49.78 51.31
avg. var., rounds 31-60 53.02 43.00 49.07
Note: avg. outputs are calculated by using the output levels 20, 23, 30, 36, and 40.
Standard deviations of avg. output of the 6 independent observations per treatment
are given in parentheses.
The average of individual variances over all 60 and the last 30 periods are
also given in Table 3. Figure 2 shows average outputs per treatment in an
average block time series, organized in blocks of ten periods.
Both, Table 3 and Figure 2, clearly show that the seemingly innocent
changes in information conditions have a systematic impact on behavior.
While there is no significant diﬀerence between average quantities in the
first round, the diﬀerences in quantities over all 60 and the last 30 rounds
are highly significant.10 Moreover, the ordering is as predicted by the gen-
eralized imitation model. Outputs in ROLE are lower than in FULL, and
in FULL lower than in GROUP. The p—values for (two—sided) permutation
tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) on the basis of the average out-
puts per population are as follows:
ROLE ≺
.008 FULL ≺.02 GROUP.
This is exactly in line with the qualitative predictions derived in the previous
section. However, the quantitative diﬀerences in average quantities are less
10Also, Table 3 and Figure 2 indicate that there is an increasing trend in output. The
Spearman rank order correlation coeﬃcients between the time series of the average output
levels and time are positive in all treatments, and significant at the 0.01 level (two-sided)
in GROUP (rs = 0.49) and FULL (rs = 0.62), but not significant in ROLE (rs = 0.23).
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Figure 2: Block time series of average outputs per treatment (actual data).
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pronounced than predicted by imitation theory, though, which indicates that
other factors play a role, too.
For now, we summarize our findings in the following two statements.
Result 1 The reference group has a significant impact on behavior.
Result 2 Outputs are ordered as predicted by hypothesis QH.
Given the usual noise in experimental data from human subjects, Result
2 seems quite remarkable. However, before drawing more definite conclu-
sions about the viability of imitation it is necessary to analyze individual
adjustments which we shall do in the following section.
4.2 Individual Behavior
A proper experimental test of imitation theories needs to consider individual
data. Thus, in this section we evaluate the success of the imitation models
by computing compliance rates of individual adjustment behavior with the
predictions of the respective models. We begin by classifying individual
behavior into the following categories: (i) ‘Best’: the subject played last
period’s best evaluated action in his reference group, (ii) ‘Better’: the subject
switched to an action that was evaluated as better than his own action, but
not as the best, (iii) ‘Same’: the subject did not change his action despite
observing a better strategy in his reference group, (iv) ‘Worse’: the subject
changed to an action that was evaluated as worse than his own action, and
(v) ‘Diﬀerent’: the subject changed to an action that was not observed in
the reference group. Table 4 reports how many decisions fall into each of
the categories (i) through (v) for each treatment and both evaluation rules.
The diﬀerences between the max and the average rules are very small which
is due to the fact that the two rules typically prescribe the same actions
(because the strategy with the highest max is typically also the one with
the highest average). Only in less than 2% of all cases do they diverge.
Hence, for ease of presentation we will focus on the max rule from now on.
There are a couple of observations which are immediate from inspecting
Table 4:
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Table 4: Classification of Individual Behavior by Type of Change
Best Better Same Worse Diﬀerent
ROLE
34.9%
35.9%
1.7%
1.8%
13.4%
12.3%
8.5%
8.5%
41.5%
GROUP 41.2% 2.3% 18.1% 5.3% 33.1%
FULL
32.6%
32.8%
7.0%
7.1%
22.8%
22.7%
11.1%
10.9%
26.5%
Note: Reported are the percentages of subjects that switched to actions in the
various categories. Upper values are calculated using the average rule, lower values
by using the max rule.
• There is very little switching to worse or better (but not best) actions.
Most subjects either repeat their previous choice, imitate the most
successful action, or experiment by switching to a new action.
• Imitation of the previously most successful action is most prevalent in
treatment GROUP.
Recall that WIBA and WIBM predict that agents should not switch to
actions evaluated as worse than the own action in the previous round. Table
4 shows that pooled over all treatments only 8.3% of choices violate this con-
dition. To put this rate into perspective, we need a method that contrasts it
with the corresponding rate that would obtain if there were no relation be-
tween behavior and imitation. We use the following method. We randomly
simulate the behavior of 100 populations of nine players for 60 periods, and
calculate the success of the hypothesis relative to this simulated data. In
order to give random behavior the best shot, we take the experimentally
observed frequencies of actions as the theoretical distribution from which
random behavior is generated. The simulations show that random behavior
would violate the “never imitate worse than own” condition in 16% of cases,
which is significantly higher than the actual rate at all standard significance
levels according to a permutation test.
Result 3 On average, the “never imitate worse than own” condition is vi-
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olated in only 8.3% of cases which significantly outperforms random
predictions.
Another interesting way of slicing through the data shown in Table 4 is
to compute how often subjects are in line with the predictions of a simple
imitation rule like IBM. We classify behavior as compliant with IBM if either
the best action was imitated or there was no change in action (inertia). Thus,
by summing the values obtained for ‘Best’ and ‘Same’ in Table 4 we find
a compliance rate of 58.3% pooled over all treatments. Given that there
are many non—imitating choices, it is not surprising that this rate is not
terribly high, although it is significantly higher than under random play,
which would yield a compliance rate of 34.6% (using the method described
above).11 This further confirms that imitation is present in our data, and
that, in particular, IBM and IBA play a significant role in explaining it.
One can also compute a compliance rate for IBM given that subjects play
an action they have previously observed.12 In ROLE this yields a compliance
rate of 82.9%, in GROUP 88.6%, and in FULL 75.5%. These rates are very
high and indicate that when players imitate, they mostly imitate the best.
So far, we have only examined averages across subjects. But, as one
would expect, there is substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ propensity to
imitate. Figure 3 shows the distribution of individual players on the basis
of the (unconditional) compliance rates for IBM (for all treatments pooled
together). About 10% of the players show a percentage of unconditional
compliance with IBM above 80%. This suggests that there is a sizeable
number of almost pure imitators. It is also worth noting that more than
35% of the participants comply with IBM in more than 60% of all decisions.
Let us summarize this by stating a further result.
Result 4 IBM and IBA do about equally well, and both outperform random
predictions significantly. Moreover, 10% of subjects are almost pure
11Permutation tests on the basis of the average rates of compliance for the populations
show that IBM outperforms random predictions at any conventional significance level.
12By dividing the sum of “Best” and “Same” through (100 minus “Diﬀerent”).
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Figure 3: Distribution of individual players on the basis of the compliance rates
with IBM, all treatments pooled.
imitators whose choices are in line with IBM/IBA in more than 80%
of all decisions.
Finally, let us briefly discuss the second observation we made after in-
specting Table 4. There is more compliance with IBM (or IBA) in treatment
GROUP than in ROLE. A permutation test yields significance at the 5%
level (two-sided).13 This is an interesting finding that will gain further sup-
port below. Intuitively, one might expect that imitation of others who are
in the same role as oneself is more appealing than imitation of a competitor
who, after all, might have a diﬀerent payoﬀ function. Recall that, at least
initially, our subjects do not know that they are playing a symmetric game.
Also, subjects are randomly rematched every period and cannot expect to
face the same opponents as last period.
Result 5 Imitation is significantly more pronounced when subjects can ob-
serve their immediate competitors (as in treatment GROUP) than
when they can observe others who have the same role in diﬀerent groups
(as in treatment ROLE).
13All other pairwise comparisons are not statistically significant.
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4.3 Estimating imitation rules
The predictions of Schlag’s imitation rules “Proportional Imitation”, DI
and SPOR explicitly refer to the probability of imitating an action. To do
justice to these predictions, we present in this section estimates for subjects’
choice functions. In particular, we analyze how subjects’ decisions to change
their action depends on their own payoﬀ and the best payoﬀ they observe.
Furthermore, we also analyze how the likelihood of following IBM depends
on a subject’s own payoﬀ and the best observed payoﬀ.14
Table 5 shows regression results for the first question–what makes sub-
ject change their strategy. The first column for each treatment shows esti-
mations for a simple linear probability model with random eﬀects:
Pr(sti 6= st+1i ) = α+ βπti + γ(πtimax − πti) + vi + εti, (1)
where sti denotes subject i’s strategy in period t, π
t
i the subject’s own payoﬀ,
πtimax the maximal payoﬀ the subject observed in his reference group, while
vi is the subject-specific random eﬀect, and εti is the residual. Note that we
include πti directly and also in form of the payoﬀ diﬀerence between max
payoﬀ and own payoﬀ. This allows to test whether only the diﬀerence mat-
ters, as predicted e.g. by Schlag’s Proportional Imitation rule, or whether
own payoﬀ and maximal payoﬀ enter independently. If β is not significantly
diﬀerent from zero, then only the payoﬀ diﬀerence matters.
As a robustness check Table 5 also shows estimation results for a model
that includes an additional term borrowed from the reinforcement learn-
ing literature. Reinforcement learning could be seen as the main rival to
imitation in our experiment where subjects know very little about their en-
vironment. But including a term capturing an element of reinforcement
learning is here not so much a step toward a more complete model of what
our subjects really do but rather a check whether imitation remains a signif-
icant force when one allows for other ways of learning. As in the basic model
of Erev and Roth (1998) the propensity of a strategy is simply the sum of
14Due to the high correlation of the best max and the best average, results for IBA are
very similar and, therefore omitted.
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Table 5: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their action
ROLE GROUP FULL
constant 886∗∗∗ 997∗∗∗ 579∗∗∗ 730∗∗∗ 611∗∗∗ 756∗∗∗
(42.6) (40.4) (26.9) (26.4) (44.1) (37.3)
own payoﬀ −.316∗∗∗ −.289∗∗∗ −.197∗∗∗ −.164∗∗∗ −.121∗∗∗ −.077∗∗∗
(.033) (.033) (.024) (.024) (.029) (.029)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .098∗∗∗ .100∗∗∗ .476∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .211∗∗∗ −.208∗∗∗
(.035) (.034) (.043) (.043) (.032) (.031)
relative – −387∗∗∗ – −418∗∗∗ – −467∗∗∗
propensity (37.5) (37.6) (36.5)
R2 .075 .131 .077 .146 .042 .174
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ denotes significance at the
5% level.
all past payoﬀs a player obtained with that strategy. The relative propen-
sity is the propensity of a strategy divided by the sum of the propensities
of all strategies. The regressions in Table 5 include the relative propensity
of the currently used strategy. Thus, the expected sign of the coeﬃcient is
negative. For further robustness checks Appendix D shows that the results
for all regressions are essentially the same for linear fixed-eﬀects models and
random-eﬀects probit models.
The regressions consistently show that the coeﬃcients for own payoﬀs are
significantly negative while those for the observed payoﬀ diﬀerence between
own and best strategy are significantly positive, which is in line with the
theoretical prediction. This holds for all treatments and the coeﬃcients
have the same order of magnitude. However, confirming what we have seen
in other parts of the data analysis, the coeﬃcients are largest in treatment
GROUP. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcients turn out to be very robust
to the inclusion of the propensity term, which is significant and has the
expected sign in all treatments. Thus, reinforcement learning seems to be
a factor and it helps to improve the explanation of the observed variance.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the propensity term does not diminish the
significance of the variables related to imitation.
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Table 6: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM
ROLE GROUP FULL
constant 127∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 145∗∗∗ 113∗∗∗ 164∗∗∗ 166∗∗∗
(41.2) (41.9) (22.5) (25.4) (43.6) (45.3)
own payoﬀ −.001 .004 −.043 −.058∗ .056 .056
(.038) (.038) (.030) (.030) (.038) (.039)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .248∗∗∗ .246∗∗∗ .551∗∗∗ .586∗∗∗ .156∗∗∗ .156∗∗∗
(.038) (.038) (.045) (.047) (.040) (.040)
relative – −90.1∗ – 131∗∗∗ – −13.4
propensity (4.77) (49.1) (61.6)
R2 .038 .038 .080 .087 .009 .009
# of obs. 2079 2079 1644 1644 1920 1920
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. Only cases with st+1i 6= sti included. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at the
1% level, ∗ significance at the 10% level.
After analyzing when subjects switch to a diﬀerent action, we shall now
analyze what makes them switch to the action with the best payoﬀs if they
switch at all. Table 6 reports subjects’ likelihood of following IBM (contin-
gent on switching to another action)15 as a function of their own payoﬀ and
the observed payoﬀ diﬀerence. As before the estimation results shown here
are for linear probability models with random eﬀects. Appendix D contains
fixed eﬀects and probit models. The first column for each treatment shows
results for:
Pr(st+1i = s
t
imax | st+1i 6= sti) = α+ βπti + γ(πtimax − πti) + vi + εti, (2)
where stimax is the action that had the highest maximal payoﬀ (IBM) in
period t in subject i’s reference group and all other variables are as de-
fined before. The second column shows, as before, estimation results for a
model that includes a propensity variable, this time the propensity of the
action with the highest observed payoﬀ (and thus, the expected sign of the
coeﬃcient is positive).
Table 6 shows that, as Schlag’s models suggest, for IBM only the payoﬀ
diﬀerence matters. In all three treatments the coeﬃcient of the diﬀerence
15 Since the theories allow for inertia, not switching is always in line with the prediction.
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variable has the expected sign and is significant at the 1% level. In con-
trast, the coeﬃcient of own payoﬀ is only (weakly) significant in treatment
GROUP and not significantly diﬀerent from zero in the other treatments.
This is strong support for all rules that satisfy Property (ii) above, in par-
ticular for Schlag’s Proportional Imitation rule. Moreover, the results are,
as before, robust to the inclusion of the propensity term (although this time
the propensity term does not improve the explanation of the observed vari-
ance, has an unexpected sign in treatment ROLE, and fails to be significant
in treatment FULL).
We briefly summarize in
Result 6 In line with Schlag’s imitation models, estimations show that the
probability with which a subject changes his action decreases in his own
payoﬀ and increases in the maximal observed payoﬀ. Further, the prob-
ability of imitating the best action is driven mainly by the diﬀerence
between maximal observed and own payoﬀ.
4.4 Questionnaire results
While the choice data we collected clearly show that many of our subjects
behave as if they imitate, one cannot be sure whether subjects are aware
of what they are doing and imitate intentionally. But we have additional
evidence in form of a post-experimental questionnaire. Apart from asking for
their major field of studies,16 we asked subjects to explain in a few words
how they made their decisions and to answer a multiple choice question
regarding the variables they based their decisions on. In particular, we
asked: “Please sketch in a few words how you arrived at your decisions.”
In addition, there was a multiple choice question about which variables
had impact on their decisions. Table 7 summarizes subjects’ responses to
this multiple choice question. In all treatments own past payoﬀs were of
importance to a majority of subjects and in all but treatment GROUP own
payoﬀs were the most frequently named factor. More than 50% of subjects
took also payoﬀs of other players into consideration. Interestingly, we again
16There are no significant eﬀects with respect to the field of studies.
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Table 7: Multiple choice questions
Number of subjects Treatment
influenced by... ROLE GROUP FULL
own past payoﬀ(s) 37 34 32
payoﬀs of others in group − 39 30
payoﬀs of others in role 33 − 19
Note: There were 54 subjects per treatment. All subjects chose at least one cate-
gory, but multiple answers were possible.
find that subjects are more interested in imitation when they can observe
payoﬀs of their immediate competitors (compare Result 5 above).
Some of the free—format answers sketching the decision criteria employed
are also quite instructive. To summarize them we have classified the answers
into seven main categories which are shown in Table 8 together with selected
typical answers. Some subjects argued exactly as assumed by the various
imitation theories (classifications “group” and “role”). But other subjects
simply chose at random, tried to diﬀerentiate themselves from the behavior
of others, or followed obscure patterns. There were also subjects who were
clever enough to find out the payoﬀ structure of the game (but were often
in despair about their opponents’ play). Finally, some subjects reported to
follow only their own past payoﬀs.
Table 9 lists by treatment the frequency of answers that fall into these
8 categories. Imitation of others in the same group is again a frequently
cited motivation in both, GROUP and FULL, whereas role—imitation is less
prevalent. Random behavior and own—payoﬀ driven behavior is frequent in
all treatments. But there are also types that like to diﬀerentiate themselves,
types that believe in pattern or pattern recognition, and there are some
clever types that guessed the payoﬀ structure correctly.
The key finding in this subsection is
Result 7 Subjects not only behave as if they imitate but many imitate inten-
tionally. Other behavioral modes like random choices, pattern driven
behavior, or behavior determined by own past payoﬀs can also be ob-
served.
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Table 8: Classification of questionnaire answers
classification typical answer
role “Answer with highest payoﬀ of other players in previous round”
group
“When I had the highest payoﬀ, kept the action for the next
round. Otherwise switched to the action that brought
the highest payoﬀ. Sometimes had the impression that
convergent actions of all players yielded lower payoﬀs.”
random “by chance since all attempts of a strategy failed!”
contrarian
“tried to act anti-cyclically, i.e. not to do what the other
Z-players have done” (in treatment ROLE)
pattern
“tried to find out whether an action yielded high payoﬀs
in a particular order – but pattern remained unknown”
“...proceeded according to the scheme: ADBECADBEC...”
clever
“My impression of the rule was that low letters correspond to
low numbers. The sum of payoﬀs seemed to be correlated with
the sum of the letters but those with higher letters got more.
I attempted to reach AAA but my co-players liked to play E...”
own “found out empirically where I got most points on average”
Note: These answers are typical because they are very descriptive of the categories
not because they are typical for all answers in this category.
Table 9: Frequency of questionnaire answers
classification Treatment
ROLE GROUP FULL
role 6 − 3
group − 10 12
random 17 9 15
contrarian 5 2 5
pattern 2 − 6
clever − 8 2
own 9 13 11
Note: A few answers were classified into two categories.
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5 Conclusion
In contrast to traditional theories of rational behavior, imitation is a behav-
ioral rule with very “soft” assumptions on the rationality of agents. Im-
itation is typically modelled by assuming that subjects react to the set
of actions and payoﬀs observed in the last period, by choosing an action
that was evaluated as successful. Recent theoretical results have increased
economists’ interest in imitation. Of particular importance are results due
to Vega—Redondo (1997) and Schlag (1998). Remarkably, the models make
quite diﬀerent predictions in many games, most notably in Cournot games,
where the former predicts the Walrasian outcome while the latter predicts
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In principle, these diﬀerences could be due
to the diﬀerent adjustment rules the models employ and/or the diﬀerent
informational conditions they assume. We study both rules in a general-
ized theoretical framework and show that the diﬀerent predictions mainly
depend on the diﬀerent informational assumptions.
Comparatively slight changes in feedback information are, thus, pre-
dicted to aﬀect behavior. Behavior is predicted to be more competitive if
agents observe their immediate rivals than if they observe others who play
in diﬀerent groups against diﬀerent opponents. From the vantage point of
many other (learning) theories these diﬀerences appear surprising. Yet, in
an experiment we provide clear evidence for the relevance of the information
structure.
If agents only receive information about others with whom they interact,
all rules that imitate successful actions imply the Walrasian outcome as
the unique stochastically stable state. If agents only receive information
about others who have the same role as they themselves but interact in
other groups, Cournot-Nash play is the unique stochastically stable state.
If agents have both types of information, the set of stochastically stable
states depends on the specific form of the imitation rule. But, in general,
stochastically stable states range from Cournot to Walrasian outcomes in
such settings.
The experimental results provide clean evidence that changing feedback
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in this manner significantly alters behavior. Learning models that do not
take into account the observation of others’ payoﬀs cannot explain this eﬀect.
Moreover, the diﬀerences between treatments are ordered as the generalized
imitation model suggests. Direct support for the role of imitation is found
by analyzing individual adjustments. We find that imitation can explain a
substantial number of adjustments and that some subjects are almost pure
imitators. Moreover, estimating subjects’s choice functions we find support
for Schlag’s result that suggests that the likelihood of imitating a more
successful action increases in the diﬀerence between own and other’s payoﬀ.
Finally, we observe that imitation of actions seems to be more prevalent
when subjects observe others with whom they interact as opposed to others
who have the same role but play in diﬀerent groups. There is no theoretical
model that would account for such a diﬀerence. Moreover, one might think
that imitation of others who are identical to oneself is more meaningful than
imitation of others with whom we play but who might be diﬀerent. (After
all, subjects in our experiment did not know that they were playing a sym-
metric game.) But this is not supported by the data. One conjecture that
might explain the diﬀerence we observe is that imitation of more successful
actions might be particularly appealing when one directly competes with
those who are more successful. In environments where imitation prevents
agents to do worse than their immediate competitors, there is an obvious
“evolutionary” benefit from imitating. Thus, evolution might have primed
us towards imitative behavior if we compete with others for the same re-
sources. This would explain our data but more theoretical work is needed to
study the evolutionary advantages and disadvantages of imitative behavior.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that if agents observe only strategies
played in the own group, the max and average evaluation rules coincide. By
standard arguments (see e.g. Samuelson, 1994) only sets of states that
are absorbing under the unperturbed (ε = 0) process can be stochastically
stable. A straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 in Vega—Redondo
(1997) shows that only uniform states can be absorbing (in all other states
there is at least one agent who observes a strategy that fared better than
his own), which is why we can restrict attention in the following to uniform
states.17 We will show that ωe can be reached with one mutation from any
other uniform state ωs 6= ωe. The proof is then completed by showing that
it requires at least two mutations to leave the Walrasian state.
Consider any uniform state ωs 6= ωe and suppose that some player (i, j)t
switches to the Walrasian strategy e. As a consequence (i, j)t will have
the highest payoﬀ in group j which will be observed by the other group
members. By property (v) all players who were in group j at time t will
play e in t + 1 with positive probability. Moreover, due to the random
matching it is possible that the three players who were in group j at time
t will be in three distinct groups in t + 1. In that case, each of them will
achieve the highest payoﬀ in their respective group which will be observed
by their group members who then can also switch to the Walrasian strategy
e, such that ωe is reached. (If there are more than three groups, it will
simply take a few periods more to reach ωe.)
It remains to be shown that ωe cannot be left with a single mutation.
This is straightforward. In fact, it follows from exactly the same argument
as in Vega—Redondo’s result. If a player switches to some strategy s 6= e, he
will have the lowest payoﬀ in his group and will therefore not be imitated.
Moreover, he observes his group members who still play e and earn more
17Notice that the random rematching of agents into groups is crucial here. If group
compositions were fixed, diﬀerent groups could, of course, use diﬀerent strategies.
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than himself. Thus, he will switch back eventually. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Although with reference groups as in treatment
ROLE, the max and average evaluation rules do not coincide, we can use
identical arguments for both rules to prove the claim. This is due to the
fact, that we can establish the claim by restricting attention to one-shot
mutations that do not induce diﬀerent payoﬀs for any particular strategy an
agent observes.
By a similar argument as above, only states in which all role players in a
given role receive the same payoﬀ can be candidates for stochastic stability.
We will show that the Cournot state ωc can be reached with a sequence
of one—shot mutations from any other absorbing state. The proof will be
completed by showing that it requires at least two mutations to leave ωc. It
is easy to see that every non—equilibrium state can be left with one mutation.
One of the players who is currently not best replying, say (i, j), must simply
switch to his best reply. This will increase (i, j)’s payoﬀ which will also be
observed by all other players in role i. Hence, in the next period all players
in role i may have switched to their best replies against their opponents.
Thus, for the first claim it remains to be shown that there exists for any
state ω 6= ωc a sequence of (unilateral) best replies that leads into ωc. This is
easy to see by inspecting the payoﬀ matrix, but follows more generally from
the observation that the game has a potential (see Monderer and Shapley,
1996).
Now, consider ωc and see what happens when a single player (i, j)
switches to some other strategy. As he moves away from his best reply,
he will earn less than the other agents in the same role i. As he can observe
these other agents, he will not be imitated and will eventually switch back.
Thus, it is impossible to leave ωc with one mutation which completes the
proof.¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Note again that only uniform states can be
candidates for stochastic stability. We will show that it takes one mutation
to reach the set {ωc, ωd} from any absorbing state not in this set while it
takes two mutations to leave this set. Consider first a possible transition
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from ωe to ωc.With 1 mutation a transition to the state ω = (cee)(eee)(eee)
is possible. The two e—players in group 1 observe two e—players (including
themselves) that earn 400 and two others that earn 0, which is on average
200. But they also observe one c—player who gets 300. Thus, with positive
probability in the next round all players in group 1 play c and one round
later everyone plays c. We denote this possible transition in short as:
ωe
1→ (cee)(eee)(eee)→ (ccc)(eee)(eee)→ ωc,
where the number above the arrow denotes the required number of muta-
tions.
It is easy to see that the following transitions from x = a, b to y = c, d
require one mutation only,
ωx
1→ (yxx)(xxx)(xxx)→ (yxx)(yxx)(yxx)→ ωy
as well as the transition from ωe to ωd,
ωe
1→ (dee)(eee)(eee)→ (ddd)(eee)(eee)→ ωd.
Any transition from a state ωy, y = c, d to some states ωx, x 6= y, is
impossible with one mutation as the process must return to ωy
ωy
1→ (xyy)(yyy)(yyy)→ ωy.
Transitions from {ωc, ωd} to ωe require 2 mutations:
ωc
2→ (ccc)(ccc)(aec) → (cec)(cec)(aec)→ ωe
ωd
2→ (ddd)(ddd)(ead) → (edd)(edd)(eae)→ ωe.
Transitions inside the set {ωc, ωd} also require 2 mutations in both direc-
tions,
ωd
2→ (ccd)(ddd)(ddd) → (ccc)(ddd)(ddd)→ ωc
ωc
2→ (ccc)(ccc)(adc) → (cdc)(cdc)(adc)→ ωd.
Thus, {ωc, ωd} is the set of stochastically stable states.¥
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Proof of Proposition 4. Again notice first that in treatment FULL a
state is absorbing if and only if it is uniform. (Otherwise there are still some
actions that will eventually be imitated.) We will first show that we can
construct sequences of one-shot mutations that lead from any of the two
“collusive” uniform states (where everybody plays a or everybody plays b)
into one of the others (which we claim to be stochastically stable). Then
we will show that it requires three simultaneous mutations to leave the
more competitive states (where everybody plays c, everybody plays d, or
everybody plays e).
The first step is easy. Consider one of the two collusive states and sup-
pose that one agent, say (i, j) switches at time t to either c, d, or e. Clearly,
this agent will have the highest overall payoﬀ and can be imitated by every-
body in R(i, j). Now suppose that in t+1 agent (i, j) will only be imitated
by agents who are also in role i but not by those in his group (due to inertia).
Then each group in t + 1 will have one player with a competitive strategy
and two with collusive strategies (regardless of the matching). The highest
payoﬀs are, of course, obtained by those who now play the more competitive
strategy and everybody can observe at least one of these agents. Hence, in
t+ 2 everybody will play the competitive strategy.
Next we show that it is not possible to leave one of the competitive
states with a single mutation. Take, for example, the Walrasian state, ωe,
and suppose that one agent (i, j) switches at some time t to some strategy
other than e. This will have two consequences: (i, j) will earn less than
the other agents in group j but more than the other agents in role i. Now
suppose that the other agents in role i imitate (i, j) in t+ 1, but that (i, j)
himself, does not immediately switch back to e (due to inertia). Then in t+1
all players in role i will play the same strategy other than e while everybody
else will still play e. Clearly, the latter earn more than the former such that
now everybody can revert to playing e.
The same argument applies to states where everybody plays d or every-
body plays c. Moreover, a similar argument applies for the case of two
simultaneous mutations. (Again inertia can be used to compose identical
strategy profiles in all groups after the mutations and the first round of
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imitation.) The proof is completed by the observation that any uniform
state can be reached from any other uniform state by exactly three simul-
taneous mutations. For movements from less to more competitive states we
can make such a transition if all players who have the same role i simulta-
neously switch to higher quantities. For reverse movements from more to
less competitive states we can construct the transition if all players in the
same group j simultaneously switch to lower quantities.18 This completes
the proof. ¥
B Imitation Equilibrium
We shall briefly review the recently introduced notion of an imitation equi-
librium (IE) (Selten and Ostmann, 2001), and derive its predictions for our
treatments. Unlike the preceding models, imitation equilibrium is a static
equilibrium notion. Following Selten and Ostmann (2001) we will say that
player (i, j) has an imitation opportunity if there is an skh 6= sji , skh ∈ O(i, j),
such that the payoﬀs of player (h, k) are the highest in R(i, j) and there is
no player in R(i, j) playing sji with payoﬀs as high as (h, k).
19 A destination
is a state without imitation opportunities. An imitation path is a sequence
of states where the transition from one element of the sequence to the next
is defined by all players with imitation opportunities taking one of them.
The imitation path continues as long as there are imitation opportunities.
An imitation equilibrium is a destination that satisfies that all imitation
paths generated by any deviation of any one player return to the original
state. Two classes of imitation paths generated by a deviation (henceforth
called deviation paths) that return to the original state are distinguished.
(i) Deviation paths with deviator involvement : the deviator himself takes
an imitation opportunity at least once and the deviation path returns to the
original state.
18Hence, a generalization of our statement for arbitrary numbers of groups and arbitrary
group sizes is not possible. The set of stochastically stable states will, in general, depend
on whether there are more roles or more groups.
19This requirement is the same as in IBM.
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(ii)Deviation paths without deviator involvement : the destination reached
by a deviation path where the deviator never had an imitation opportunity
gives lower payoﬀs to the deviator than those at the original state, making
that the deviator returns to the original strategy. This creates an imitation
path that returns to the original state.
The following proposition reveals remarkable similarities between Selten
and Ostmann’s imitation equilibrium and the dynamic class of WIBM rules.
In fact, imitation equilibrium and the long-run predictions of WIBM coincide
perfectly for the current game.
Proposition 6 Imitation equilibrium (IE) is characterized by the following.
(a) In Treatment GROUP the Walrasian state ωe is the unique IE.
(b) In Treatment ROLE the Cournot state ωc is the unique IE.
(c) In Treatment FULL ωc, ωd, and ωe are the only uniform IE.
Proof (a) Only uniform states can be imitation equilibria, otherwise there
would be an imitation opportunity. To see that ωe is an imitation equilib-
rium note that if (i, j) deviates from ωe will experience lower payoﬀs than
any other player; nobody follows and (i, j) returns to e. To see that any
other uniform state is not an imitation equilibrium consider the deviation
of (i, j) to the immediate higher production level. This creates an imitation
opportunity to players in group j. By random matching this deviation may
spread out the whole population, in which case a destination is reached. At
the destination the payoﬀs of (i, j) are lower than at the original distrib-
ution. Player (i, j) returns to the original action. Now players in group j
have higher payoﬀs than (i, j), do not imitate him, and (i, j) has an imitation
opportunity to go back to the deviation strategy.
(b) If (i, j) deviates from ωc, he will get lower payoﬀs than players in role
i. Nobody follows the deviation, and (i, j) returns to c. This shows that ωc
is an imitation equilibrium. It is easy to show that any state other than ωc
where members of the same role play the same action, but where diﬀerences
between roles are not excluded, is not an imitation equilibrium. Note then
that there is a (i, j) that is not best-replying, then a deviation of (i, j) to
his best-reply gives to him higher payoﬀs, creating an imitation opportunity
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to players in role i. At this destination (i, j) has higher payoﬀs than at the
original state, and hence does not return to the original action. It remains to
be shown that a state where at least one role whose members play diﬀerent
actions is not an imitation equilibrium. If in such a case, in any random
matching any player has an imitation opportunity, then the assertion holds.
Assume the opposite, then since there are not two diﬀerent best-replies that
give the same payoﬀs, at least one player is not best-replying, and hence the
above argument shows that such a state is not an imitation equilibrium.
(c) To show in FULL that non-uniform states are not imitation equilibria
is tedious, and hence we concentrate on uniform states. We first show that
ωc is an imitation equilibrium. At ωc let (i, j) deviate to sji 6= c. Then
players in role i will have higher payoﬀs than (i, j) and players in group j
will observe that those players in their respective role have higher payoﬀs
than (i, j). Hence, nobody follows. Then, (i, j) observes that c gives higher
payoﬀs to players in role i and hence returns to c.
Now we show that ωe is an imitation equilibrium. At ωe let (i, j) deviate
to sji 6= e. In t+ 1 players in role i will follow since will have lower payoﬀs
than (i, j) and will observe that their respective group players also have
lower payoﬀs than (i, j), but players in group j will not follow since will
have higher payoﬀs than (i, j). In t + 2 all players in role i including (i, j)
will imitate their respective group players and hence ωe is reached.
We now show that ωd is an imitation equilibrium. If at ωd (i, j) deviates
to sji ∈ {a, b, c}, then a deviation path that returns to ωd, analogous to
the one analyzed for the case of ωe, is generated . If at ωd, (i, j) deviates
to sji = e, then a deviation path that returns to ω
d, analogous to the one
analyzed for the case of ωc, is generated.
To show that ωa and ωb are not imitation equilibria it is enough to
show that there exists a sequence of random matchings that makes that the
imitation paths do not return to the original state. Let x = a, b and y = b
if x = a and y = c if x = b. Then, one can check that the following path
can be generated: ωx → (yxx)(xxx)(xxx) → (yyx)(yxy)(yxx) → ωy →
(xyy)(yyy)(yyy)→ ωy. ¥
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C Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Do
not talk with the person sitting next to you and remain quiet during the
entire experiment. If you have any questions please ask us. We will come to
you.
During this experiment, which takes 60 rounds, you will be able to earn
points in every round. The number of points you are able to earn depends
on your actions and the actions of the other participants. The rules are very
easy. At the end of the experiment the points will be converted to Euros at
a rate of 3000:1.
Always 9 of the present participants will be evenly divided into three
roles. There are the roles X,Y,Z, taken in always by 3 participants. The
computer randomly allocates the roles at the beginning of the experiment.
You will keep your role for the course of the entire experiment.
In every round every X-participant will be randomly matched by the
computer with one Y - and one Z-participant. After this, you will have to
choose one of five diﬀerent actions, actions A,B,C,D, and E. We are not
going to tell you, how your payoﬀ is calculated, but in every round your
payoﬀ depends uniquely on your own decision and the decision of the two
participants you are matched with. The rule underlying the calculation of
the payoﬀ is the same in all 60 rounds.
After every round you get to know how many points you earned with
your action and your cumulative points.
In addition, you will receive the following information:
[In ROLE and FULL] You get to know which actions the other two par-
ticipants who have the same role as you (and who were matched with diﬀer-
ent participants) have chosen, and how many points each of them earned.
[In GROUP and FULL] You get to know which actions the other two
participants you were matched with have chosen, and how many points each
of them earned.
[In FULL] Furthermore you get to know how many points all 9 partici-
pants (in all the 3 roles) on average earned in this round.
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Those are all the rules. Should you have any questions, please ask now.
Otherwise have fun in the next 60 rounds.
D Regressions
In this appendix we show all regression results for models (1) and (2). Ta-
bles 10, 11, and 12 show the results for what makes subjects switch to
another strategy (model 1). Table 10 contains the estimations for treat-
ment GROUP, Table 11 for ROLE, and Table 12 for FULL. The first two
columns in each table show the results from the linear random eﬀects model,
also shown in the main body of the paper. The third and fourth columns
show results obtained from a linear model with subject-specific fixed eﬀects
and the fifth and sixth column show estimates from a random eﬀects probit
model (marginal eﬀects at population means).
Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the results for what makes subjects follow
IBM (model 2). Table 13 contains the estimations for treatment GROUP,
Table 14 for ROLE, and Table 15 for FULL. Again, the first two columns
in each table show the results from the linear random eﬀects model, also
shown in the main body of the paper. The third and fourth columns show
results obtained from a linear model with subject-specific fixed eﬀects and
the fifth and sixth column show estimates from a random eﬀects probit
model (marginal eﬀects at population means).
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Table 10: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their actions in
treatment ROLE.
ROLE linear, random eﬀects linear, fixed eﬀects
probit, random eﬀects
marginal eﬀects only
constant 886∗∗∗ 997∗∗∗ 879∗∗∗ 979∗∗∗ – –
(42.6) (40.4) (35.6) (36.8)
own payoﬀ −.316∗∗∗ −.289∗∗∗ −.311∗∗∗ −.284∗∗∗ −.369∗∗∗ −.325∗∗∗
(.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.04) (.04)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .098∗∗∗ .100∗∗∗ .105∗∗∗ .108∗∗∗ .129∗∗∗ .133∗∗∗
(.035) (.034) (.035) (.034) (.04) (.04)
relative – −387∗∗∗ – −353∗∗∗ – −413∗∗∗
propensity (37.5) (38.0) (45.9)
R2 .075 .131 .075 .129 – –
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 11: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their actions in
treatment GROUP.
GROUP linear, random eﬀects linear, fixed eﬀects
probit, random eﬀects
marginal eﬀects only
constant 579∗∗∗ 730∗∗∗ 581∗∗∗ 709∗∗∗ – –
(26.9) (26.4) (17.8) (22.5)
own payoﬀ −.197∗∗∗ −.164∗∗∗ −.195∗∗∗ −.165∗∗∗ −.225∗∗∗ −.185∗∗∗
(.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.03) (.03)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .476∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗ .448∗∗∗ .429∗∗∗ .552∗∗∗ .538∗∗∗
(.043) (.043) (.044) (.043) (.05) (.05)
relative – −418∗∗∗ – −355∗∗∗ – −457∗∗∗
propensity (37.6) (39.3) (46.1)
R2 .077 .146 .077 .145 – –
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 12: Estimating the likelihood that subjects change their actions in
treatment FULL
FULL linear, random eﬀects linear, fixed eﬀects
probit, random eﬀects
marginal eﬀects only
constant 611∗∗∗ 756∗∗∗ 613∗∗∗ 736∗∗∗ – –
(44.1) (37.3) (31.2) (32.9)
own payoﬀ −.121∗∗∗ −.077∗∗∗ −.123∗∗∗ −.089∗∗∗ −.148∗∗∗ −.104∗∗∗
(.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.04) (.04)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .211∗∗∗ .208∗∗∗ .208∗∗∗ .204∗∗∗ .275∗∗∗ .277∗∗∗
(.032) (.031) (.032) (.031) (.04) (.04)
relative – −467∗∗∗ – −389∗∗∗ – −516∗∗∗
propensity (36.5) (38.1) (50.1)
R2 .042 .174 .042 .166 – –
# of obs. 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186 3186
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ denotes significance at the
5% level.
Table 13: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM in treatment
ROLE.
ROLE linear, random eﬀects linear, fixed eﬀects
probit, random eﬀects
marginal eﬀects only
constant 127∗∗∗ 146∗∗∗ 122∗∗∗ 148∗∗∗ – –
(41.2) (41.9) (39.7) (40.8)
own payoﬀ −.001 .004 −.002 −.009 −.015 −.011
(.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.04) (.04)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .248∗∗∗ .246∗∗∗ .249∗∗∗ .248∗∗∗ .234∗∗∗ .233∗∗∗
(.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.04) (.04)
relative – −90.1∗ – −126∗∗∗ – −113∗∗
propensity (47.7) (48.6) (50.7)
R2 .038 .038 .038 .037 – –
# of obs. 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ denotes significance at the
5% level, ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Table 14: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM in treatment
GROUP.
GROUP linear, random eﬀects linear, fixed eﬀects
probit, random eﬀects
marginal eﬀects only
constant 145∗∗∗ 113∗∗∗ 116∗∗∗ 111∗∗∗ – –
(22.5) (25.4) (21.2) (24.9)
own payoﬀ −.043 −.058∗ −.013 −.015 −.069∗ −.077∗∗
(.030) (.030) (.031) (.030) (.04) (.04)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .551∗∗∗ .586∗∗∗ .577∗∗∗ .582∗∗∗ .546∗∗∗ .565∗∗∗
(.045) (.047) (.045) (.047) (.05) (.05)
relative – 131∗∗∗ – 20.5 – 98.5∗
propensity (49.1) (56.5) (55.3)
R2 .080 .087 .078 .080 – –
# of obs. 1644 1644 1644 1644 1644 1644
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level ∗∗ denotes significance at the
5% level. ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 15: Estimating the likelihood that subjects follow IBM in treatment
FULL
FULL linear, random eﬀects linear, fixed eﬀects
probit, random eﬀects
marginal eﬀects only
constant 164∗∗∗ 166∗∗∗ 154∗∗∗ 159∗∗∗ – –
(43.6) (45.3) (40.5) (45.3)
own payoﬀ .056 .056 .059 .059 −.057 −.057
(.038) (.039) (.038) (.039) (.04) (.04)
payoﬀ diﬀ. .156∗∗∗ .156∗∗∗ .152∗∗∗ .151∗∗∗ .165∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗
(.040) (.040) (.040) (.040) (.04) (.04)
relative – −13.4 – −22.1 – −15.2
propensity (61.6) (62.4) (65.2)
R2 .009 .009 .009 .009 – –
# of obs. 1920 1920 1920 1920 3186 3186
Note: All coeﬃcients and standard errors multiplied by 103. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗denotes significance at the 1% level.
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